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INTRODUCTION
This  Essay  summarizes  and  perhaps  extends  slightly  some  important
recent  work,  mostly  by  political  scientists,  on  the  structural  relation
between  the  array of political  power  in  a  nation's  nonjudicial  branch  or
branches  and  the  way  in  which judicial  review  is  exercised  in  relatively
stable  democracies.  Robert  Dahl's  classic  article  identified  one  such
relation.1  According  to Dahl, "[e]xcept  for short-lived transitional  periods
when the old alliance  is disintegrating  and the new one  is struggling to take
control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the
dominant  national  alliance." 2   What,  though,  if there  is  no  "dominant"
national  political  alliance?  Can  anything  systematic  be  said  about  the
courts'  role  during transitional  periods?  Recent  scholarship  suggests  that
Dahl describes only one part, albeit perhaps a large  one, of a more complex
picture.
This  Essay  draws  on  that  scholarship,  dealing  with  constitutional
adjudication  around  the  world,  to  describe  three  patterns  of relationship.
Part  I  describes  a  form  of partisan  entrenchment  similar  to the  one  Dahl
described.  Part  II  describes  a more  dynamic  form  of such entrenchment.
Part  III  describes  a  pattern  of  consensual  delegation  of  policy-making
authority  to  the  courts.3  A  brief  conclusion  suggests  that  the  type  of
analysis  in which I engage  in  this Essay  will produce  useful  insights  into
constitutional law and politics if that analysis is extended and elaborated.
Two preliminary comments  on method are appropriate.  First, sometimes
I use terms  suggesting that these patterns result from intentional  choices by
politicians  and judges.  At times the  choices  are  indeed  intentional,  but at
times  they  are  not.  Sometimes  the  outcomes  result  from  the  overall
structures  of politics  and  institutions  and  the  incentives  they  set  up  for
*  Carmack  Waterhouse  Professor  of  Constitutional  Law,  Georgetown  University  Law
Center.
1.  Robert  A.  Dahl,  Decision-Making in  a  Democracy:  The  Supreme  Court as  a
National  Policy-Maker,  6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957).
2.  Id. at 293.
3.  I draw the term  "partisan entrenchment"  from Jack M.  Balkin & Sanford  Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87  Va.  L.  Rev.  1045  (2001),  but give  it  a
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politicians  and judges.  Second,  political  and  institutional  structures  and
incentives  underdetermine  behavior, and the patterns  I describe  will never
capture  everything  about  a  constitutional  court's  behavior.  Rather,  they
describe  central  tendencies  that appear  when political  power  is  arrayed in
specified  ways.  My  discussion  may  illuminate  a  fair  amount  of  what
constitutional  courts  do,  but there  will be  corners,  perhaps  large  ones,  the
understanding of which will require different forms of explanation.
I.  THE DEEPLY ENTRENCHED  PARTISAN COALITION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Dahl  described  the  pattern  after  a  political  coalition  establishes  its
dominance.  He  argued  that  the  U.S.  Constitution's  provisions  for
nominating  and  confirming  federal  judges  implied  that  as  new  Justices
replaced  old  ones,  the  Supreme  Court  would  come  to  be  composed  of
Justices  whose  constitutional  vision  was  compatible  with  that  of  the
dominant  coalition.4  Norms  of appropriate judicial  behavior  to match the
dominant coalition's  vision  are likely  to develop  as  well,  if the  coalition's
dominance  is  sustained  over  a  generation  or two.  The  result  is that  the
constitutional  court  in  such  a  system  routinely  ratifies  central  national
policies,  and takes on the governing  coalition, if at all, only with respect to
issues at the fringes of the coalition's concerns.
Political  scientists  describe  this pattern  from the  perspective  of elected
officials.  These  officials  are  able  to  enact  whatever  policies  they  think
appropriate because  of their sustained political  dominance.  In the absence
of serious electoral  challenge,  why  would they  tolerate the existence  of an
institution  that  would  do  what their  electoral  opponents  cannot-that  is,
displace  policies  important  to  the  dominant  coalition?  Elected  officials
select  (and  train)  constitutional  court  judges  whose  constitutional
interpretations will not impede the dominant  coalition's policies.
The  evidence  for  this  pattern  comes  from  various  nations.  Sweden's
constitution  has  provided  for  judicial  review  for  many  years,  but  the
Swedish  Supreme  Court  has  barely  exercised  its  power  to  invalidate
national  legislation. 5  One  reason  is  constitutional  text,  which  authorizes
invalidation  of national  legislation  only  if the  inconsistency  between  the
law and the constitution  is "manifest."'6  Another reason, though, is the long
dominance  of social  democratic  parties  in  the  Swedish  Parliament. 7  A
4.  For an example of the way in which different  selection mechanisms might affect the
relation between political and judicial power, see infra text accompanying notes  39-41.
5.  See Judicial Activism  in Comparative Perspective  2  (Kenneth M. Holland ed.,  1991)
(noting that as of 1991,  "the Supreme Court of Sweden has never found a law of the Riksdag
to be repugnant  to the constitution"); E-mail  from Eivind  Smith,  Professor of Constitutional
Law,  University of Oslo, to author  (Sept.  12,  2006,  03:48 EST)  (on file with the  Fordham
Law  Review)  (stating  that  "the  [Swedish]  courts  have  barely  exercised  [its]  power  to
invalidate  national legislation on Constitutional Grounds"  (internal quotations omitted)).
6.  Regeringsformen[RF][Constitution]  11:14  (Swed.),  available  at
http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/RPageExtended_  6328.aspx.
7.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Sweden's  membership  in  the  European  Union  (EU)  might
induce a greater degree of judicial invalidation, including invalidation of some  laws adopted
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similar pattern  has  occurred  in  Japan.  Modeled  on the  U.S.  Constitution,
the  Japanese  constitution  of  1947  provided  for judicial  review,  but  the
Japanese  Supreme  Court  has  been  quite  inactive,  to  the  point  where  its
occasional  invalidations  of legislative  and  even  administrative  policy  on
constitutional  grounds  are  the  subject  of  great  attention. 8   Here  the
explanation  seems  equally  straight-forward--the  long  domination  of
Japanese politics by the Liberal Democratic Party.
In the United States, Dahl accurately describes the Supreme Court during
periods of what Bruce  Ackerman calls  "normal politics,"  which occur after
moments  of  constitutional  transformation. 9  Ackerman's  description  of
alternating periods of constitutional  and normal politics, in turn, helps make
sense of the rhythm of judicial review in the United States, with its peaks of
activism  during  transitional  periods  and  its  valleys  of  restraint  during
periods of normal politics.
And  yet,  the  Dahlian  perspective  seems  somewhat  flat  and  lacking
nuance.  The reason, I suggest, is that Dahl's contribution  came quite early,
and  that  more  recent  theoretical  developments  in  the  field  of American
political development  provide  the  opportunity  for an elaboration  of Dahl's
insight that preserves  its core  but allows us to  see more  complex patterns.
Karen Orren  and Stephen  Skowronek have  given  the label  "intercurrence"
to  the phenomenon  that  different  political  orders--or,  in the terms  I have
used,  different  constitutional  orders-can  coexist  or  at  least  can  overlap,
with  some  aspects  of an  older  constitutional  order  persisting  after  a  new
order  has  come  into  being.'0  And,  importantly,  intercurrence  means  that
principles  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  new
constitutional  order may persist-and  so  be  enforced by  the courts--even
as the new order settles in.
Consider here  the Supreme  Court produced by Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal.  As Kevin McMahon has shown, that Court laid the foundation for the
by the  Swedish  Parliament under  the direction  of the EU (that  is, resulting  from  Sweden's
compliance with EU "directives").  The reason is  that such  laws, though  nominally resulting
from decisions  by the Swedish Parliament, are  in fact the product of decisions made outside
Sweden, and not necessarily by a political coalition similar to that dominant  in Sweden itself.
For  an  example,  see  http://dsv.su.se/jpalme/society/Ramsbro-HD-domen.html  (last  visited
Oct.  3,  2006)  (providing  the  Swedish  text  of  a  decision  of  June  12,  2001,  partially
invalidating  as  inconsistent  with  the  Swedish  constitution  parts  of the  EU  data  privacy
directive).
8.  See David  S. Law,  Generic Constitutional Law, 89 Minn.  L.  Rev. 652,  692  n.142
(2005)  (citing  sources  supporting  the  proposition  that  "[iut  is  consistently  observed  that
judicial review in Japan is extremely  deferential  in practice").
9.  For  Ackerman's  terminology,  see,  e.g.,  Bruce  Ackerman,  We  the  People:
Transformations  265 (1998).  For  a qualification,  see  infra text accompanying  notes  18-19
(describing  the  use  of judicial  review  to  clean  up  local  "outliers"  whose  legislation  is
inconsistent with the policies of the dominant national coalition).
10.  For  Orren  and  Skowronek's  term,  see  Karen  Orren  &  Stephen  Skowronek,  The
Search for American Political Development  108-18  (2004).  For my term,  see Mark Tushnet,
The New Constitutional Order 1 (2003) (defining  "constitutional order").
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Warren  Court's  revolution  in  civil  rights  and  civil  liberties."I   Yet,
Roosevelt  and those  who  helped  him select  Supreme  Court Justices  were
largely  indifferent  to,  and  some  were  actively  hostile  to,  expansive
interpretations  of civil rights and civil liberties.  They chose  Justices whom
they  knew  were  "reliable"  on  the  issues  of national  power  that centrally
concerned the Roosevelt  Administration.  As it happened,  nearly everyone
who  was  committed  to rejecting  the Old Court's vision of limited national
power  was  also  a  political  liberal.' 2   And,  their  liberalism  found  its
grounding in some aspects of the libertarianism that animated the Old Court
itself.  On issues of race, for example, the New Deal's progressive Justices
could invoke Buchanan v.  Warley, which relied at least in part on property
rights  ideas  to  invalidate  municipal  ordinances  requiring  residential
segregation. 13   Substantive  due  process  cases  like  Meyer  v.  Nebraska
retained  unacknowledged  vitality  when  the  New  Deal  Court  began  to
develop  the  idea that legislation  differentially  affecting  fundamental  rights
had to receive extremely  careful  review. 14  And some  Justices  approached
free speech  issues with a libertarian  sensibility that drew some of its force
from dissents to statist decisions from the Old Court.  Recall here one of my
preliminary  qualifications, that the patterns  I describe  need not result from
intentional choices made by elected officials.  That seems clearly true of the
New Deal Court's decisions on civil rights and civil liberties.  They were a
by-product  of the  conscious  choice  to place  supporters  of national  power
over commerce on the Supreme Court. 15
Finally,  it  is  worth  observing  that  the  political  scientists'  concept  of
intercurrence  fits  nicely  with  Ackerman's  argument  that  the  Supreme
Court's  task after constitutional  moments  have passed is to  synthesize  the
principles  of the  new  constitutional  order  with  those  principles  of older
orders that retain their vitality. 16
11.  See generally Kevin  J.  McMahon,  Reconsidering  Roosevelt  on  Race:  How  the
Presidency Paved the Road to Brown (2004).  I  should note that my account differs on some
matters of detail from McMahon's, but that my account has been strongly influenced by his.
12.  The term  Old Court  refers  to the U.S.  Supreme  Court before  1937.  For  this usage,
see, e.g., Ackerman, supra  note  9, at 280-81.
13.  245 U.S. 60(1917).
14.  See  Skinner v. Oklahoma,  316 U.S.  535 (1942);  Meyer v. Nebraska,  262 U.S.  390
(1923).
15.  For a related  discussion, see Jack  M. Balkin  & Sanford Levinson, The Processes  of
Constitutional  Change: From Partisan  Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 489 [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Processes  of Constitutional  Change].
16.  For  Ackerman's  description  of the  synthetic  task,  see  Bruce  Ackerman,  We  the
People:  Foundations  86-94  (1991).  I would qualify this observation  only by noting that, at
least as elaborated  so far, Ackerman's  description appears  to  make permanent  the synthetic
enterprise,  whereas the concept of intercurrence  suggests that the synthetic task lasts only as
long as the principles  of the older constitutional  order retain some force  in some significant
domains.
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II.  POLITICAL RELIANCE  ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Part  I  has  described  one  way  in  which  a  constitutional  court  can
collaborate  with  elected  officials-by  refraining  from  interpreting  the
Constitution  to  interfere  with the  implementation of those  officials'  policy
agendas.  Other forms of collaboration are possible.' 7
Consider first a simple possibility,  in which there is significant consensus
across  party  lines--that  is,  between  members  of the  dominant  political
coalition  and members  of the minority-on  some  important  constitutional
values.  Yet,  there  is  some possibility  of dissent  from  that consensus,  for
example, by outliers who happen to control one or a few local governments.
Such  departures  are  bothersome  to  the  dominant  coalition  because  they
provide the minority with political opportunities.  If the left is in control, for
example,  defections  to the more extreme  left might foster defections to the
right,  bringing  the  minority  into  power.  Or,  the  minority  might  gain
political mileage  by castigating the dominant coalition for failing to  control
its  members  or,  more  important,  for  secretly  harboring  the  ambition  to
advance  the  defectors'  policy  notwithstanding  the  dominant  coalition's
seeming adherence to the consensus.  The dominant coalition might use the
courts to discipline--that  is, invalidate--these opportunistic  defections. 18
The notion of outliers implicates an additional form of using the courts to
implement  the  dominant  coalition's  policy  agenda.  Effectively
implementing  such  an  agenda  is  often  difficult.  In  particular,  doing  so
might require reaching  rather far down into the daily operations of ordinary
public  bureaucracies.  The  dominant  coalition  has  a  choice  among
implementation  tools.  The  courts  can  be  a  particularly  useful
implementation  device  for dealing  with  matters of detail  that  are  hard  for
the national  legislature  or  its  own bureaucracies  to get  a  handle  on.  We
could  describe  the  dominant  coalition  as  delegating  some  aspects  of
implementation to the courts,  or as allocating policy implementation  among
a number of institutions, one of which is the judiciary. 19
Lucas A. Powe's discussion of the Warren Court provides one prominent
example  of  this  sort  of  delegation  or  allocation.20   Powe  describes
17.  I note  one  theoretical  possibility,  although I  am aware  of no good  examples  of its
instantiation.  A  dominant  national  coalition  might  use  the  courts  to  discipline--that  is,
invalidate-opportunistic  defections  from  the  coalition's  agreements,  which  might  occur
when some component of the coalition  sees the chance  for a  short-term electoral  gain  from
defection,  and  the rest  of the  coalition  fears  that  the  defection  will  lead  to the  coalition's
collapse and displacement  from power.
18.  I suspect  that an  account  like that  in the text describes a fair amount of the work  of
the modem German Constitutional  Court, although I have not done sufficient research to be
confident about that judgment.
19.  The dominant  coalition could  use some of its (relatively  limited) legislative time to
discipline  these  outliers,  but the  courts are  an  available  resource that  the coalition  can  use
instead.  Presumably, the  implicit calculation  is that the coalition  gains  more by  freeing up
time  in the legislature  than  it  loses  by imposing  these mopping-up operations on the courts,
which do lose some time that they might devote to other tasks.
20.  Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics (2000).
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"history's  Warren Court"--that  is, the Warren Court at its height from  1962
to  1968,  as  enforcing  the  national  Democratic  policy  agenda  against  two
targets.  "The  geography  of constitutional  violations  [found by the Warren
Court]  ...  is the South by an overwhelming  margin.  Then it picks up urban
areas of Catholic dominance."
21
During  "history's  Warren  Court,"  the  South's  values--on  matters
relating to race, religion, and criminal justice-were increasingly out of line
with the values held by the central figures  in the national Democratic Party.
Powe  summarizes  the Warren  Court's work  on the Constitution  and  race:
"[T]he  legal regime of race was nationalized.  . . . But the effort was not a
national  one.  It was directed exclusively  at the South and was designed  to
force  the  South  to  conform  to  northern--that  is,  national--norms." 22
Griswold v.  Connecticut23  exemplifies  legislation in the  second target area.
By  1965  only  Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  New York
had  statutes  on  the  books  making  it  an  offense  to  use  contraceptives.24
Statutory  repeals  had  been  thwarted,  at  least  from  the  perspective  of
national Democratic  elites, by  the undue  political  influence of the  Roman
Catholic  Church.  Griswold was  the  national  political  coalition's  way  of
bringing these states into line.  In Powe's words, "[t]he  South was an outlier
on  segregation;  the  Northeast  on  contraception;  and  the  Court  was
tolerating no outliers."
25
Mark  Graber's  important  article,  The  Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,
identifies  another  significant  form  of  collaboration  between  elected
politicians  and the courts.26  Courts discipline  outliers in the  service  of the
dominant  national  coalition's  policy  agenda.  Graber  points  out  that
sometimes  the  coalition  does not have  an  agenda with  respect  to specific
issues  that  are,  nonetheless,  important  to the coalition's  components.  The
reason  is  that  the  components  care  about  the  issue  but  seek  to  have  it
resolved in opposing ways.  If the coalition's  leaders  seek to  advance  one
policy  approach  to  the  issue,  they  will  fracture  their  coalition.  From the
leaders'  point of view, the best solution is to keep the  issue out of politics.
Sometimes, though, that is impossible.  Graber argues that their second-best
21.  Id. at 493.
22.  Id.  at  490.  Powe  also  observes  that  "[t]he  Court's  handful  of  religion  cases
paralleled  the geography  of the obscenity  cases.  They were either from  the  South or from
the arc  running from New England  through the Middle Atlantic  states where  laws already on
the books acquired the backing of the local Catholic hierarchies."  Id. at 492.
23.  381  U.S. 479 (1965).
24.  See  Powe,  supra note  20,  at  376  (referring  to  Connecticut  and  "its  backward
cousins" in those  states).
25.  Id.  at  372.  I  should  note  that  the  national  Democratic  Party's  policy  agenda
combined electoral  considerations,  such as retaining the support of African-Americans  in the
North  and  perhaps  gaining  such  support  from  African-Americans  in  the  South,  with
ideological ones,  such as  a commitment  to a substantive liberalism that emphasized  freedom
of choice  with  respect  to  personal  matters  and  the  need  to  control  market  choices  in  the
economy.
26.  Mark  A.  Graber,  The  Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:  Legislative Deference to  the
Judiciary,  7 Stud. in Am.  Pol. Dev. 35  (1993).
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strategy might  be to  get someone  else  to  resolve the  issue,  and then  hope
that the resolution will "stick"  in a way that allows the electoral  coalition to
hold  together.  Delegating  the  issue  to  the  courts--that  is,  to  judicial
elites-might  be  particularly  attractive  when  political  elites  believe  that
they share  the views  of judicial  elites on the  issue but are unable to act on
those views because their constituents  (the "base") hold opposing views.27
Graber offers two examples.  In one,  the delegation of the divisive issue
to  the  courts  failed,  and  in  the  other  it  was  a partial  success.  The  first
example  is the issue of slavery in the  1850s.  The  Democratic Party was a
rough  coalition  of  Northerners  ambivalent  at  best  about  slavery  and
Southerners  deeply committed to  its continued existence.  Issues related  to
slavery kept appearing  on the national political agenda,  and each time they
did  the  question  of  slavery's  constitutionality  arose  and  made  achieving
solutions  to each  specific  issue  more  complicated.  According  to  Graber,
Democratic  Party  strategists  welcomed  the  possibility  that  the  Supreme
Court might be able  to take the slavery issue out of politics.  On this view,
the communications between members of the Supreme Court and President-
elect James Buchanan  as the Dred Scott case was pending were no accident.
The Justices  informed Buchanan that they were  about to hold the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional on the ground that Congress lacked the power
to  ban  slavery  in  the  western  territories,  and  in  his  inaugural  address
Buchanan  appealed  to  the  nation  to  accept  the  Court's  forthcoming
decision.  Of course,  because  that  decision  declared  unconstitutional  the
central plank  in the  Republican Party platform,  thereby  appearing to  make
the  leading opposition  party's program unachievable,  the  delegation of the
issue  to  the Court  may  have  solved  the  problems  facing  the  Democratic
Party's  leadership  in the short run, but  only at the cost of tearing the party
and the nation apart a few years later.
Graber's  second  example  is  the  abortion  issue.  Here,  he  argues,  both
major  parties  faced  internal  divisions.  The  Democratic  Party  was  a
coalition that included urban Catholics opposed to abortion and members of
the professional middle classes who tended to hold progressive views on the
issue.  The Republican Party was a coalition that included Northeastern  and
other cosmopolitan business-oriented conservatives and, since the campaign
of Barry Goldwater  in  1964, an  increasing number of social conservatives.
As  abortion-rights  activists  pressed  their  issue  on to  the  political  agenda
throughout the country,  the strategy of delegating the decision to the courts
made sense, Graber argues, to the political leadership of both parties.
This  strategy  was  a  partial  success.  The  abortion  issue  continued  to
divide the Democratic  Party, but not the Republican Party.  The reason was
that  the  abortion  issue  mattered  a  great  deal  to  both  components  of the
Democratic  coalition,  but  mattered  far  more  to  the  Republican  Party's
conservative  base  than  to  its  business-oriented  component.  Further,
27.  I place the term "base"  in scare-quotes because  it is not clear to me that there is any
analytic way of fairly singling out one component of a coalition as the coalition's base.
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Republican  leaders could hold their coalition together by blaming the courts
for their failure to  deliver  a strong anti-abortion  policy to  the conservative
base.  Eventually,  of  course,  the  base  caught  on  and  insisted  on  the
appointment  of judges  whom  they  hoped  would  sooner  rather  than  later
make  it  possible  to  make  abortion  illegal  again.  And,  strikingly,  as  that
strategy  took  hold,  Northeastern  Republicans  began  to  rethink  their
commitment to the party.
Both  examples  illustrate  one  drawback  to  the  strategy  of delegating
divisive  issues  to  the  courts.  The  abortion  example  as  seen  from  the
Republican  side shows what can happen when judicial elites take a position
compatible  with  the  views  of one  portion  of the  dominant  coalition  but
incompatible  with the views  of the  coalition's  core or base.  The  strategy
may  solve  the political problems  faced by elected leaders  in the  short run,
but it can only succeed  in the long run if those who lose in the courts accept
that loss.  There are pretty clearly no structural reasons for believing that the
losers will  do so,  and Graber's  examples  show, at the least, that they have
not  always  done  so.  The possibility  that delegating  divisive issues to the
courts  will not take them off the political agenda  therefore  implies that the
strategy makes  sense only for political  leaders  with a relatively  short time-
horizon:  Such  leaders  will  maintain  their  power  in  the  short  run  by
delegating  the  issue  to  the  courts,  and  they  will  not  be around  to  worry
about the political consequences in the longer run.
This observation  about  politicians'  time-horizons  helps  frame  the  final
relationship  between  political  power  and judicial  power that I describe  in
this Essay.
III.  ATTEMPTED PARTISAN ENTRENCHMENT  VIA JUDICIAL  REVIEW
DURING TRANSITIONAL  PERIODS
Ran  Hirschl's  recent  work  on  the  establishment  of judicial  review  in
stable  democracies,  and  related  scholarship,  has  shown  one  basic
relationship  between  political  power  and  judicial  power.28  The  story
Hirschl  and  others  tell is this:  Consider  a political  coalition that has been
dominant for a reasonably long period but that comes to foresee that it will
lose  electoral  control  relatively  soon.  The  leaders  of that  coalition use  the
power they still have  to entrench  in the courts judges who will (a)  do what
they  can  to  continue  to  advance  the  (soon-to-be-displaced)  coalition's
28.  Ran  Hirschl,  Towards  Juristocracy:  The  Origins  and  Consequences  of the  New
Constitutionalism  (2004)  (discussing  the  adoption  of judicial  review in  four nations  in the
late  twentieth century).  For additional  studies contributing  to the literature  on this version of
partisan  entrenchment,  see  Tom  Ginsburg,  Judicial  Review  in  New  Democracies:
Constitutional  Courts  in  Asian  Cases  (2003);  J.  Mark  Ramseyer,  The  Puzzling
(In)Dependence of  Courts:  A  Comparative Approach,  23  J.  Legal  Stud.  721  (1994)
(discussing  Japan);  Matthew  C.  Stephenson,  When  the Devil Turns ...  :  The  Political
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review,  32  J.  Legal  Stud.  59  (2003)  (developing  a
formal model of the process).
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policy agenda,  and  (b)  do what they can to  obstruct the implementation  of
the former opposition, now dominant, coalition's policy agenda.
The canonical  U.S. example  of this form of partisan entrenchment  is the
Federalists'  attempt to pack the federal  courts after they decisively  lost the
national  elections  of 1800  but,  because  of a  serious  flaw  in constitutional
design,  retained office  for several  months.29  The Federalist  Congress  and
President John Adams attempted to pack the federal  courts by reorganizing
them in a  way that created new positions  filled by the  Federalist "midnight
judges."  That particular strategy failed when the new Congress repealed the
reorganizing  statute and  the  Supreme  Court let the repeal  take effect.  But,
as  we  all  know,  the  Federalists  had  another  arrow  in  their  quiver:  the
appointment of John  Marshall  to  serve as  Chief Justice.  Marshall's job,  it
seemed,  was  to  entrench  Federalist  constitutional  theories  and
interpretations  in the Supreme  Court, thereby  impeding the  implementation
of Jeffersonian policies.
And, as again  we all know, even that strategy did not work terribly well.
True,  Marshall's  Court  confirmed  the  widespread  understanding  that  the
Supreme  Court could  hold  national  statutes  unconstitutional, 3 0  but he  and
his  Court  did  not  use  that  power  to  block  any  important  Jeffersonian
programs.  Still, as the second  Justice John Marshall  wrote, "the value of a
sword of Damocles  is that it hangs  [here,  over the head of the  legislature,]
not that  it drops,"  that is,  that the courts threaten  invalidation  even if their
threat  never needs  to  be  carried out.31  And Marshall  did use  the judicial
power to harass  Jefferson's  administration, particularly  in connection with
the prosecution  of Aaron Burr.32  But, in the end,  the most that can be  said
for  the  Federalist  attempt  at  partisan  entrenchment  is  that  it  led  to  the
adoption  of  doctrines  of  national  power-a  moderate  nationalist
constitutionalismri--that  authorized  the  national  government  to  do  a lot  of
what  the  Federalists  hoped  it  would  do.  A  robust  Jeffersonian
constitutionalism  might have looked quite different.  Yet, it is not clear that
even  Jeffersonian  judges  would  have  articulated  a  constitutionalism  that
severely limited the possibilities  for national power.  And why would they
want  to?  As  long  as  Jeffersonians  controlled  the  political  branches,
vigorous  exercises  of national  power were  likely  to  be  rare.  When  they
occurred they would be in the service of Jeffersonian goals, so Jeffersonians
would  hardly  be  likely  to  desire  to  find  their  own  policies
unconstitutional.
33
29.  For a recent detailed  account, see  Bruce  A. Ackerman,  The Failure of the Founding
Fathers:  Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy (2005).
30.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137 (1803).
31.  Arnett v. Kennedy,  416 U.S.  134, 231  (1974)  (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
32.  For a  discussion of John  Marshall's role  in the  treason  trial  of Aaron  Burr, see  R.
Kent Newmyer, John Marshall  and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court  179-202  (2001).
33.  See also  Balkin  &  Levinson,  Processes  of Constitutional  Change, supra note  15
(describing a similar phenomenon on recent constitutional developments).
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Several features  of this version of partisan entrenchment  should be noted.
First, the U.S. example,  while dramatic,  may be  a bit misleading because it
involves a case in which judges were put into place as part of the strategy of
partisan  entrenchment.  More usually,  though,  the  coalition  about  to  lose
power can rely on the judges already  in position, who were appointed when
that coalition's  dominance  was unchallenged  and seemingly permanent,  to
carry the coalition's policies forward.
Second, the Jeffersonian  response to partisan entrenchment-eliminating
the  newly  created judgeships  and  attempting  to  remove  one  of the  most
partisan  of the  entrenched judges-demonstrates  that the new  coalition  in
power  has  resources  with  which  to  combat  an  attempted  partisan
entrenchment.  Indeed,  the  existence  of such  resources  suggests  that this
version of partisan  entrenchment  has  inherent  limits.  The new  coalition's
ability  to  respond  or  retaliate  may  be  constrained  a bit by  "rule  of law"
ideas, but only a bit, particularly to the extent that its leaders and supporters
interpret  what  has  gone  before  as  an  attempt  at partisan  entrenchment. 34
The judges  who  are the  vehicles  for, partisan entrenchment  therefore  must
be  careful  about  what they  do,  tempering  the  most  aggressive  actions  on
behalf of the displaced coalition so that they can fight another day.35
But,  of course,  that  day  might  never come.  Ackerman's  account,  and
indeed  the  general  structure  of this  version  of  partisan  entrenchment,
identifies a final  important feature of the story, related to the second.  If the
formerly  dominant  coalition  loses  power  for  a  long  time,  this  form  of
partisan entrenchment  cannot  succeed  permanently.  Eventually the former
opposition will  be  in  a position  to  place  its  own  supporters  in  the courts.
So,  as indeed Ackerman's  account of the Marshall Court  suggests, the best
the  displaced  coalition's  leaders  can hope  for is  that their partisans  in  the
courts  will  be  able  to  delay  and  smooth  out  the  transition  between  one
constitutional  order and the next.36  Except  for this:  Political leaders  who
foresee their defeat  in the next election may believe that they will return to
office soon.  If they are correct, judicial delay and obstructionism can make
it possible  for those political leaders to carry  on as before once they come
back  into  power.  From  the  leaders'  point  of  view,  then,  partisan
entrenchment  is an attractive strategy.  It might lead them to win in the long
run (if they return to power),  and it allows them  to  lose gracefully (if they
do not).
When  they  foresee  their  loss of power  and  so  consider  the  strategy  of
partisan  entrenchment  in the courts,  political  leaders cannot  know whether
34.  I  suspect  that  the  unfolding  story  of judicial  review  in  Israel,  which  is  one  of
Hirschl's cases, will end up illustrating these  limits and constraints.
35.  This  has  become  the  standard  account  of the  Marshall  Court's  response  to  the
Jeffersonian  counterattack:  asserting  the  power  of judicial  review  in  Marbury on  a
substantive  issue  no  one  cared  about,  and  giving  the  repeal  of the  1801  Judiciary  Act  a
constitutional pass  in Stuart v. Laird,  5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803).
36.  I take this to be  one aspect of Ackerman's  account of the synthetic  task courts must
perform.
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their loss of power will be temporary or permanent.  That uncertainty might
provoke  some thought about  the next step  in executing  the strategy.  What
should the now-entrenched judges do?  One might think that they ought to
obstruct the newly empowered  coalition because, after all, that is what those
who  appointed  them  had  in  mind.  Yet,  the  possibility  that  political
coalitions  will  cycle  into  and  out  of power  suggests  that  the  strategy  of
partisan entrenchment  followed by obstructionism is unstable:  Your judges
obstruct  their  program;  when  they  anticipate  losing  power,  they  appoint
their own judges; those judges obstruct your program; and no one does well
at all.
Consider, then, another possibility.  Of course, once normal politics takes
hold, the courts  will collaborate  with  the dominant coalition until the  next
transition looms.  At that point the story becomes quite interesting.  The tit-
for-tat  strategy  I  have  just  described  has  its  drawbacks.  The  U.S.
experience  with transitions  generated  an alternative  strategy,  albeit one  far
more  developed  in  theory  than  in  practice.  This  is  the  theory  generally
labeled  "judicial restraint."  Basically  it  is  a  theory  of bi-  or  multilateral
disarmament.  The  political  leadership  of  a  currently  dominant  coalition
says  to its  opponents,  "We won't  appoint judges  who  will  obstruct  your
policy agenda if you manage  to take control, if you promise  not to  appoint
judges who will obstruct our political agenda if we come back into power."
The attractiveness  of this strategy depends  in part,  as already  suggested,
on  political  leaders'  assessment  of  the  probability  that  they  will  be
displaced  relatively  soon,  and  in  part  on  the  mechanisms  for  judicial
selection.  Consider  first a system in which the dominant  national coalition
has,  for  all  practical  purposes,  unfettered  choice  with  respect  to judicial
selection.37  In  such  a  system,  the  problems  with  the  strategy  of mutual
disarmament  are  obvious.38  First,  it  requires  that  political  leaders  have
time-horizons  that  extend  not  only  through  the  electoral  cycle  that  might
throw them out of power but also into the one that might bring  them back
into power.  Leaders  with short time-horizons  might  anticipate cycling into
and out of power quickly  and often,  but to  do  so they have to regard their
immediate  successes  as  possibly  temporary.  My  sense  is  that  political
leaders are typically more optimistic than that.
Second,  it is  entirely unclear how the mutual disarmament  deal could be
enforced.  Of course those now in power can comply with their promise, but
what can those  currently  out  of power  do  to demonstrate  that they  really
will honor their promises once they take office?  Third, and finally, it is not
clear that at any point it makes  sense for political  leaders to support mutual
disarmament.  Not during  periods of normal politics, because  the prospect
37.  Roughly,  this  corresponds  to  a majority-vote  selection  rule,  and to  the  situation  in
the United States, subject to a minor qualification about the possibility that minority  senators
may credibly threaten  to filibuster a nominee.
38.  The  difficulties  described  in  the  text  may  account  for  the  fact  that  consistent
commitments  to judicial  restraint  have  been so  hard  to come  by  in the  history  of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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of electoral  displacement  then  seems  quite  remote.  And  not  when  the
prospect  of transition  is  a  real  one,  because  the  immediate  gains  from
appointing judicial allies  are  likely to outweigh the remote  and speculative
benefits that will accrue only when the next transition occurs.
Contrast  this with  a selection rule  giving members  outside the dominant
political  coalition  veto power over judicial  selection.  The  commitment  to
judicial  restraint  can  then  be  enforced  by  exercising  the  veto.39   The
German  selection  rule,  which  (simplifying)  requires  a  two-thirds  vote  to
confirm an appointment,40 might have this effect.41
The  analogy to  weapons-control  agreements  suggests  a final  possibility.
During  the Cold War good  behavior with respect  to nuclear  weapons  was
induced by the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD):  The United
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  both  knew  that  if  either  misbehaved,  the
consequences  would  be  both  immediate  and  disastrous.  So,  perhaps,  the
best strategy for opposing political parties  is to commit themselves  to using
the courts as vigorously  as they possibly can,  with  the threat that doing so
would provoke a constitutional crisis.  The difference between MAD in the
arms control and judicial review contexts is this:  MAD would occur almost
immediately  upon misbehavior,  whereas  the possibility of a  constitutional
crisis  that  seriously  damages  both  sides  seems  difficult  to  imagine.  The
analogy might be saved,  a bit, by the observation that judicial appointments
tend to be  spread out  over a  reasonably extended  period.  The contending
parties  will  frequently  have  allies  on the  courts.  As  a  result,  each  side
might be in a position to provoke a constitutional  crisis.  That in itself might
induce a degree of restraint that could be described  as an equilibrium.
Jack  Balkin  and  Sanford  Levinson  have  supplemented  the  preceding
account  of  partisan  entrenchment  by  identifying  another  version.  The
account  I  have  sketched  so  far  has  political  leaders  entrenching  their
supporters  in the  courts.  Upset  by Bush v.  Gore,42 Balkin  and Levinson
describe  the  obverse:  judges  entrenching  their  political  allies  in  the
electoral  branches.43  Here  the judges  foresee  the  displacement  of those
allies, and use their power to keep them in office.
I  suspect  that  many  readers  will  find  such  judicial  action  normatively
troubling.  Consider,  then,  this  defense:  The  judges  believe-perhaps
correctly-that  the  displacement  of their electoral  allies  is an  aberrational
39.  This proposition holds at least to the extent that the judges who are chosen  adhere to
a commitment to judicial restraint that they demonstrate prior to appointment.
40.  For  the  German  selection  rule,  see  Donald  P.  Kommers,  The  Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 21-22 (2d ed. 1997).
41.  But see supra text accompanying note 28 (suggesting that the German Constitutional
Court has  engaged  in relatively  vigorous judicial  review with respect  to issues  as  to which
there is substantial consensus across party  lines).
42.  531  U.S. 98 (2000).
43.  Hirschl  describes  a  number  of other  interventions  by  constitutional  courts  in  the
selection of electoral  officials,  although  he  does  not spell  out the  "partisan  entrenchment"
account  of such  interventions  (which  may  not be  accurate  with  respect  to  some  of those
interventions). Hirschl, supra  note 28, at 169-210.
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departure from the "normal"  course of politics.  They believe,  again perhaps
correctly, that they are operating within a period of normal politics,  and yet
someone  is  about  to  take  office  who  would  attempt  to  transform  those
politics,  and so the constitutional  order, without adequate  support from the
electorate.  The attempt to begin  a constitutional revolution that the judges
see on the horizon lacks sufficient justification, and, from the judges'  point
of view,  is  likely to  fail,  but only  at some  real  cost  to stable  democracy.
Ensuring  that  normal  politics  continues  is  not  obviously  troubling  in
normative terms.
44
Bush  v.  Gore  suggests  yet  another  version  of partisan  entrenchment
driven by  the  courts.  Elsewhere  I  have  argued  that the  Rehnquist  Court
brought  constitutional  law  to  the  threshold  of  a  constitutional
transformation,  but did not cross that threshold.45  The transformation  was
the  one  sought,  again unsuccessfully,  by-successively-Barry  Goldwater,
Ronald Reagan,  and Newt  Gingrich.  Suppose  a majority of the  Supreme
Court's  members  believed  that  the  increasing  attractiveness  of  the
Goldwater-Reagan-Gingrich  program to the American people foreshadowed
a  successful  constitutional  transformation  that  would  be  thwarted  once
again by the presidency  of Al  Gore but accomplished  by the presidency  of
George  W.  Bush.  Here  partisan  entrenchment  gives  a  shove  to  a
constitutional  transformation  that  is  already  in  train,  but  obstructed  by
chance political events.46
One  possible  outcome  suggested  by  Balkin  and  Levinson  is  that  the
strategy  of partisan entrenchment  works  for quite  a long  time.  The courts
forestall  the  displacement  of their  political  allies;  their allies  thus  retain
power in the elected branches; the elected branches appoint new judges who
sustain  the  dominant  coalition's  policy  agenda,  mop  up  outliers,  and  the
like.  Balkin  and Levinson describe  this possibility  in alarmist tones.  Yet,
one  might  wonder, how exactly  is it  different, other than  in  its  inception,
from  the  long-term  dominance  of a national political  coalition  of the  sort
that  characterized  Sweden,  Japan,  and,  for  that  matter,  the  New  Deal
constitutional  order?  Perhaps  the difficulty  is  that partisan  entrenchment
induced  at the  outset by judicial  action  can be  sustained  only by  repeated
judicial interventions that in some sense thwart the outcomes that the people
would otherwise  reach  without judicial intervention.  I doubt that  we have
enough evidence to be confident about that proposition.
44.  Given my invocation of Bush v. Gore, I should note (a)  that I am not contending that
the  conditions  I have  described were  actually  satisfied  in 2000,  and  (b) that  the normative
defense  of this  form  of partisan  entrenchment  crucially  depends  on  the  accuracy  of the
judges'  beliefs about what the new occupants of electoral power are about to do.
45.  Mark  Tushnet,  A  Court  Divided:  The  Rehnquist  Court  and  the  Future  of
Constitutional  Law (2005).
46.  I  have toyed  with the  idea that this  form  of partisan  entrenchment  amounts  to  the
courts disciplining  temporal  outliers  in a manner parallel  to the way  in which  courts  during
periods  of normal  politics  discipline  geographic  outliers,  but  I  have  not  been  able  to
formulate the idea clearly enough to commit myself to it.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has  indicated some  of the  ways  in which  arrays  of political
power  can  be  connected  to  the  way  constitutional  courts  exercise--or
refrain  from  exercising-the  power  of judicial  review.  The  survey  is
plainly  incomplete.  The  most obvious omission  is this:  Suppose  a nation
experiences  a long period  in which  there  is no  dominant national political
coalition.  Formal models of judicial behavior  indicate that judges in  such
periods  have  complete  freedom  to enforce  whatever  constitutional  visions
they  happen  to  hold.  The  reason  is  that,  extraordinary  circumstances
aside,47  the judges'  constitutional  vision  will be  shared  by enough  elected
politicians to block any political response to the judges'  actions.48  Yet, it is
unclear to me that this formal  result actually describes reality.49
In addition to qualifications  within each of the patterns  I have described,
then, there clearly is more work to be done on the question, How do arrays
of political power relate to the exercise of judicial  review?  I hope, though,
that  this  Essay  has  indicated  why  attempting  to  answer  that  question  is
likely to produce insight into the way in which constitutional  law is made.
47.  "Extraordinary  circumstances"  refer  to  situations  where  the judges'  constitutional
visions  are  far outside  the  range  of those  held by a  significant  number  of elected  political
actors.
48.  See Tushnet, supra  note  10, at 33 (sketching the argument).
49.  Tushnet,  supra  note  45  (arguing,  with  examples  from  across  the  domain  of
constitutional  law, that the formal model  does not describe the Rehnquist Court's behavior).
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